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The Crawford School of Economics and Government,
at the Australian National University has established
a new and exciting series of policy briefs: opinion
pieces pivoting on a particular theme. These briefs
are designed to introduce key public policy areas that
are of importance to Australia and its neighbours in
the Asia and Pacific. The aim is to stimulate discussion
and expand the perspectives of the policy community.
Our first Policy Brief focuses on fisheries and
provides three perspectives: one, an overview of the
underlying causes of overfishing; two, a discussion
on the recent efforts of Australia to put its
Commonwealth fisheries on a sustainable
management path; and three, the challenges faced by
our Pacific neighbours in managing valuable and
migratory tuna fisheries. We hope you enjoy the
discussion and we look forward to delivering another
Policy Brief in the spring.
R. Quentin Grafton
Research Director
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Figure 1 World fishing fleet, 1970 and 1992 (number of vessels)
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Too few fish and too many boats
R. Quentin Grafton
The world’s fishery industries are facing the problem
of too few fish and too many boats. To many casual
observers the case of overfishing is simply another
example of humankind’s greed exceeding its needs.
The reality is, however, that even if fishers wanted
to conserve fish stocks, a reduced harvest by a
conservation-minded fisher would simply allow
someone else to catch more fish. Consequently,
whatever their concerns about the future, many
fishers have little or no incentive to conserve fish
stocks and, over time, fishery levels decline.
Of fish and fishers
Overfishing is an example of the ‘tragedy of the
commons’: the overexploitation that arises whenever
there are no property rights to a depletable natural
resource. Many fisheries jurisdictions, including
Australian fisheries, do have restrictions and barriers
to entry; few jurisdictions have open access to all
comers. These barriers and regulations have been
designed to prevent overfishing as well as place
restrictions on the number of vessels, the type of gear
that can be used, the length of the fishing season and
the size of vessels. This represents a ‘command and
control’ approach to managing fishing inputs; it leaves
the incentives for overharvesting unchanged, but
makes it more difficult for fishers to catch fish. Sadly,
these input controls have proved to be ineffective in
regulating fishing effort and many fisheries are in
decline despite their use.
Input controls provide an incentive for fishers to
‘race to fish’, catching a share of the limited compete
harvest before the end of the fishing season. Further,
when the regulated inputs constrain the ability to
harvest fish, fishers are motivated to develop and use
unregulated fishing inputs. For example, if regulations
limit the length of vessel used when fishing—thus
limiting their catch—fishers might build boats that are
much wider so as to increase their hold size while still
conforming to the ‘letter of the law’. These
substitutions generate at least three undesirable effects:
fishing effort creeps up, thereby increasing harvesting
pressure on fish stocks; over time fisheries regulations
become complicated and difficult to enforce as more
rules are promulgated to prevent further increases in
fishing effort; and input substitution often results in
reduced efficiency and lower overall net returns as
substitution to unregulated inputs is costly and cannot
increase the amount of fish in the sea. Thus, in an
attempt to redress one problem regulators have helped
to create a slow moving, inexorable slide toward an
unsustainable and unprofitable fishing industry.
The ecosystem approach
To arrest the decline of fish stocks, scientists have
argued for an ecosystem approach to fisheries
management. This approach differs from traditional
input controls, giving greater weight to integrated
management and emphasising the importance of
maintaining ecosystem health for future generations.
Particular attention is given to the precautionary
principle and the value of marine reserves as means
of preserving critical areas of habitat and as refuges
for key species. Australia has been one of the world
leaders in adopting the ecosystem approach,
establishing a National Representative System of
Marine Protected Areas, and expanding the ‘no take’
areas in the Great Barrier Reef .
While the ecosystem approach highlights the
importance of fishery–ecosystem interactions and
knowledge gaps, its practitioners often overlook
incentives for fishers as a means to improve fisheries
management. Unfortunately, without a resolution for
the ‘race to fish’ quandary the fundamental problems
of overharvesting will remain, regardless of the quality
advice offered by fisheries scientists. As a result, unless
we are prepared to make all the world’s oceans marine
protected areas, fishers will continue to harvest where
they are permitted to do so, and the problems of excess
fishing effort will remain.
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Incentive-based approaches
The key to resolving the dilemma of ‘too few fish and
too many boats’ is to change the incentives for fishers.
Ideally, fishers would be careful custodians of the sea,
limiting their harvests to conserve fish stocks, and
voluntarily choosing not to use harmful fishing
practices. Such an idyll can only be realised if fishers
have a long-term stake in the future of fisheries: if they
choose to catch less fish today they will be rewarded
by greater harvests and returns in the future.
One approach to changing incentives is to create
durable and enforceable property rights. These rights
could ensure a share of a sustainable total allowable
catch, or protect the right to harvest in particular zones
or areas of the ocean. Territorial user rights have
existed in one form or another for thousands of years.
For example, spatial management, whereby
individuals, families or groups of individuals have a
form of sea tenure, was widely practised by coastal
Aboriginals in Australia. In many parts of Oceania,
areas of lagoons and reefs were allocated to families
and clans who could reap the gains of conservation
and, conversely, the pains of overexploitation.
Numerous examples also exist of communities that
have successfully established their own fishing rules
that are observed by members of the community and
are also used to exclude outsiders. These community-
based rights have worked successfully even in some
modern fisheries (such as Japan’s coastal and inshore
fisheries) for sedentary species, but frequently fail to
provide adequate conservation incentives to those
who fish for more mobile species.
Individual fishing quotas
An alternative to both spatial management and input
controls is to allocate fishers a share of a sustainable
total allowable catch. These harvesting shares have
been referred to as individual fishing quotas, but have
also been called individual transferable quotas to
emphasise that fishers are able to sell or lease their
rights to others. Transferability confers an economic
advantage as those fishers with higher net returns per
unit of harvested fish are able to purchase rights from
those with lower net returns, thereby increasing
overall profitability. Such transfers provide an
incentive for fishers to exit voluntarily from the
industry, as well as promoting an autonomous
adjustment process, helping to reduce excess vessels
and gear employed in a fishery.
An important aspect of individual harvesting
rights is that, provided that the total allowable catch
is a binding constraint such that fishers would catch
more fish if the total harvest were at a higher level,
individual fishing quotas command a positive price.
This price provides a conservation signal in the sense
that holders of the rights can benefit from more
sustainable fishing practices because higher future
returns from fishing will be incorporated into the
value of their asset holdings of individual fishing
quotas. Harvesting rights that effectively control the
overall catch of fishers also changes what fishers must
do if they wish to catch more fish. Under input
controls, a higher individual harvest requires greater
fishing effort by an individual to out compete other
fishers. By contrast, with enforceable and binding
individual fishing quotas, fishers are obliged to buy
or lease quota to increase their harvest. This changes
the dynamic from catching as many fish as possible
in a limited period of time under input controls, to
maximising the net returns from a valuable property
right by landing higher valued fish in a more valuable
form (fresh versus frozen fish), and/or minimising
harvesting costs per unit of fish landed.
The extent to which individual fishers act with a
greater conservation ethic with individual fishing
quotas, however, depends on several factors, such as
monitoring and enforcement issues and the level of
productivity in the fishery. For instance, if fishers can
ride on the back of others’ conservational actions of
others then individual fishing quotas may be no better
than input controls. Similarly, for long-lived species
with a low growth rate some fishers may find it
profitable to continue to overexploit a fishery as any
gains from conservation would be too far into the
future.
The overall experience of individual fishing
quotas in different parts of the world, including
Australia, has been positive, but not without
problems. Successful individual fishing quotas
management requires that total allowable catches be
set at a sustainable level, disincentives be established
for dumping of fish at sea and for catching species
incidental to the fishery (such as sea turtles or sea
birds), and ensure adequate monitoring and
enforcement so that those without individual fishing
quotas are prevented from fishing, and those with the
rights respect the rules. Where this has been
successfully accomplished, individual fishing quotas
have resulted in more sustainable and profitable
fisheries.
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The way forward
The history of fisheries management in many
countries, including Australia, has not been a happy
one. For example, in the past ten years there has been
a three-fold increase in the number of Australian
Federal fisheries classified as overfished. To stop this
decline and help ensure sustainability of fish stocks,
in November 2005, the Federal Minister of Fisheries
announced a A$220 million structural adjustment
package to secure Australia’s fishing future.
The structural adjustment package includes funds
for fishers to tender voluntarily for the sale of their
fishing concessions, so as to reduce fishing effort, and
also to provide business exit assistance for fishers
whose fishing effort will be displaced following the
creation of proposed marine protected areas in the
South-east Marine Region. This assistance is timely
and will help remove fishing effort in some vulnerable
fisheries. However, without management changes that
effectively account for the incentives faced by fishers,
coupled with ecosystem approaches and effective
public oversight, Australia’s fishing future will not
be secured.
Further reading
Grafton, R.Q., Arnason, R., Bjørndal, T., Campbell,
C., Campbell, H.F., Clark, C.W., Connor, R.,
Dupont, D.P., Hannesson, R., Hilborn, R.,
Kirkley, J.E., Kompas, T., Lane, D.E., Munro,
G.R., Pascoe, S., Squires, D., Steinshamn, S.I.,
Turris B.R. and Weninger, Q., forthcoming.
‘Incentive-based approaches to sustainable
fisheries’, Canadian Journal of Fisheries & Aquatic
Sciences.
Grafton, R.Q., Kirkley, J.E., Kompas, T. and Squires,
D., 2006. Economics for Fisheries Management,
Ashgate, United Kingdom.
Grafton, R.Q., Squires, D. and Fox, K.J., 2000.
‘Private property and economic efficiency: a
study of a common-pool resource’, Journal of
Law and Economics, 43:679–713.
Kompas, T., Che, T.N. and Grafton, R.Q., 2004.
‚Technical efficiency effects of input controls:
evidence from Australia’s banana prawn
fishery’, Applied Economics, 36:1631–41.
Pauly, D., Christensen, V., Dalsgaard, J., Froese, R.
and Torres, Jr. F., 1998. ‘Fishing down marine
food webs’, Science, 279:860–63.
Pikitch, E.K., Santora, C., Babcock, E.A., Bakun, A.,
Bonfil, R., Conover, D.O., Dayton, P., Doukakis,
P., Fluharty, D., Herman, B., Houde, E.D., Link,
J., Livingston, P.A., Mantel, M., McAllister,
M.K., Pope, J. and Sainsbury, K.J., 2004.
‘Ecosystem-based fishery management’, Science,
305:346–47.
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Getting things right: structural adjustment in
Australia’s Commonwealth fisheries
Tom Kompas
Given the problems with open access resources, as
well as the effectiveness of modern fishing technology,
there are few fisheries, if any, which will not be both
overexploited and unprofitable unless they are
managed effectively. For a fishery to be economically
efficient, it is necessary that management targets be
set correctly, enforced effectively and delivered in an
inexpensive and incentive-compatible manner. An
efficient outcome is important not only because it
protects fish stocks and guarantees sustainability, but
also because it ensures that resources will be allocated
to the fishery correctly and in a way that maximises
the returns from fishing. Inefficient fisheries are
plagued by low profits and excessive boat capital or
fishing capacity, with the all too familiar outcome of
‘too many boats chasing too few fish’.
The traditional ‘command and control’
approaches to fisheries management—ones that focus
on input restrictions and total catch limits—fail to
provide the incentives for those who fish to do so
efficiently and in a manner that gives industry a long
term stake in the future of the fishery (Grafton et al.
2006a). These approaches often result in considerable
effort creep (increases in fishing power) and excessive
and wasteful competition, with both inappropriate
levels and combinations of inputs used to catch fish
(Kompas et al. 2004). The negative consequences of
input and output controls are nicely illustrated by
recent experience in Australia’s Commonwealth
fisheries. In the past 10 years the Australian federal
government has committed A$80–90 million per year
to fisheries research and ecologically sustainable
development, undertaken substantial buybacks of
fishing effort, implemented detailed scientific fishery
management plans that incorporate strong
stakeholder involvement and expanded its National
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas.
Despite such strategies, substantial effort creep in
input-controlled fisheries, and the inability to decrease
total allowable catches when necessary in output
controlled fisheries, has contributed to a threefold
increase in the number of Commonwealth fisheries
classified as overfished in the past 10 years (Caton
and McLoughlin 2004). The economics of these
fisheries has also suffered. Surveys conducted by the
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics have consistently shown close to zero net
returns in most Commonwealth fisheries over the past
several years (Kompas and Gooday 2005), and many
fisheries are currently on the verge of economic
collapse.
It is time to get things right. In November 2005
the Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation
announced a A$220 million package to secure
Australia’s fishing future. The package, ‘Securing our
fishing future’, will provide a major one-off structural
adjustment package and improved management
measures to address concerns over the state of
Australia’s fish stocks, and the sustainability and
profitability of the fishing industry. A sum of A$150
million has been allocated to reduce fishing capacity
in Commonwealth fisheries at risk, or currently subject
to, overfishing. It will also provide assistance to fishers
who may be displaced from fishing grounds following
the creation of marine protected areas in the South
East Marine Region.
The structural adjustment package will allow
fishers to participate in a voluntary tender process
that will encourage them to exit the industry and
reduce excess fishing capacity. All licence holders in
Commonwealth-only fisheries, with the exception of
internationally and jointly managed fisheries, will be
allowed to participate in the tender process but the
main target fisheries are: the Southern and Eastern
Scalefish and Shark Fishery (excluding the Great
Australian Bight), the Eastern Tuna and Billfish
Fishery and the Bass Strait Central Zone Scallop
Fishery. In the Northern Prawn Fishery, funding is
available for structural adjustment in conjunction with
the transition to a management system based on
output controls and individual transferable quotas.
This policy action is timely since it has become
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abundantly clear that the Northern Prawn Fishery is
currently experiencing severe economic hardship and
rapidly falling profits, due in large part to the
increasing price of fuel, but also to decades of ‘effort
creep’ and considerable excess capacity in the current
fishery, or ‘too many boats chasing too few prawns’
(Rose and Kompas 2004).
However, for the structural adjustment package
to be a success the Australian Fisheries Management
Authority needs to ensure that this planned reduction
in fishing capacity goes hand-in-hand with targets and
policies that guarantee economic efficiency. This
normally means pursuing some form of ‘maximum
economic yield’, or finding catch and effort levels,
along with the right number of boats and vessel
capital, that maximise returns from the fishery to the
Australian community. The Australian Fisheries
Management Authority is now fully committed to this
sort of target, but failures in the past (total allowable
catches that are far from binding in the South East
fishery and considerable effort creep in the Northern
Prawn Fishery and Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery)
raise concerns. The A$220 million could easily be
wasted if poor management allows additional boat
capacity to re-enter the fishery––something that has
happened in past structural adjustment programs in
Australia (Newby et al. 2004).
There are a number of important benefits of
pursuing economic efficiency in a fishery (Grafton et
al. 2006b). First, profits are maximised regardless of
changes in the price of fish or the cost of fishing. Profits
may be low when the price of fish is low and costs
high (due, for example, to an appreciation of the
exchange rate in Australia or the rising price of fuel),
but they will still be maximised under and the
maximum economic yield target. Pursuing economic
efficiency will also ensure that the costs of harvesting
are minimised, improving the international
competitiveness of domestic fisheries and the
resilience of the industry to economic and
environmental shocks. Second, an efficient level of
catch (at the maximum economic yield) is a
sustainable harvest, and as such is preferable to a
biological target like maximum sustainable yield.
Depending on prices and costs, profits can be zero or
even negative at the maximum sustainable yield. If
sustainability is the goal, as it should be, it makes sense
to select a sustainable yield that guarantees the largest
return from the use of the community’s fish resources
regardless of circumstances. Third, at most biological
growth rates, as well as practical discount rates and
costs of harvesting, pursuing economic efficiency will
imply an equilibrium stock of fish larger than that
associated with the maximum sustainable yield. In
this sense the efficient level of harvest is more
‘conservationist’ than maximum sustainable yield,
and provides additional environmental benefits and
added resilience to unforeseen environmental shocks
to the fishery. Finally, pursuing economic efficiency
helps prevent overcapitalisation and ensures that
resources are allocated to the fishery at correct levels,
with surplus vessel and fishing capital allocated to
their next best alternative uses in the economy. There
is no better way to maximise the returns to the
Australian community from Commonwealth fisheries,
and ‘Securing our fishing future’ is a good part of
achieving this outcome.
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Ensuring sustainable tuna fisheries in the Pacific
Kate Barclay
Around half of the world’s tuna catch comes from
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. This fishery
has been considered to be healthy compared to other
tuna fisheries around the world. The tropical tunas
(such as Skipjack and Yellowfin) are on the whole more
resilient to fishing than some of the larger temperate
tunas (such as Northern and Southern Bluefin). As
other tuna fisheries around the globe have dropped
in productivity levels and have become more tightly
regulated, fishing companies have been increasing
fishing effort in the Western and Central Pacific. In
recent years scientists have agreed that two of the four
main species of tuna caught commercially in the
Pacific, Bigeye and Yellowfin, are being overfished. A
third species, Skipjack, is still biologically safe, but
excessive and competitive fishing has caused prices
to drop by as much as half in real terms since the 1980s.
On a global scale this is concerning, but for Pacific
island countries it is potentially disastrous. Because
of their geographies and small populations, most
Pacific island countries have limited economic
opportunities. For really small island countries like
Nauru and Kiribati, tuna is one of the only economic
resources available to them. Around 40 per cent of
Kiribati government revenue comes from tuna fishing
access fees paid by fishing companies.
Tuna is not only important for revenue and the
national accounts of Pacific islands countries—it is
important in terms of Pacific Islanders’ food security.
Many Pacific Islanders live largely from food they
grow or catch, including fish. Although tuna is not as
easy to catch from a canoe as reef fish, it is still a
culturally important food source in many places. As
growing coastal populations increase the pressure on
many of the region’s reef fisheries, tuna is a potentially
important source of food and income generation for
coastal communities.
As part of my research in 2005, I travelled to
several Pacific island countries and asked local people
what they wanted from the tuna resources in the
Pacific. Interviewees were from the public and private
sectors, and from non-government organisations
concerned with the environment and community
welfare. Nearly all of them answered that they wanted
Pacific Islanders to make more money from tuna, and
for tuna industries to be both environmentally
sustainable and socially equitable. Clearly, improved
management of the region’s tuna fisheries is crucial
to achieve a balance of economic and environmental
goals.
Managing Pacific tuna fisheries
One of the basic challenges in managing tuna fisheries
is that tuna species are highly migratory—they do not
stay in the waters of specific countries but range across
the waters of many countries as well as international
waters (the high seas). This means no one country can
manage tuna fisheries alone. Tuna fisheries
management must, by definition, be carried out
multilaterally by the governments of countries whose
waters tuna pass through, and by the governments of
companies that fish tuna, including in the high seas.
For this reason multilateral government organisations
have been created under international law to manage
tuna fisheries, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission, International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and the Commission
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.
Because these organisations operate like committees,
with decisions reached by vote, they have often been
unable to agree on sufficiently stringent fisheries
management measures.
The potential negative impact of longlining on
stocks of large tuna such as Bluefin, as well as on other
species such as seabirds, turtles and sharks, has been
well publicised by environmental organisations.
Fisheries vary according to their environmental
context, however, and thus far it seems that the
tropical longline fisheries of the Pacific Ocean have
minimal impact on turtle and seabird populations.
Further research is needed to establish the impact of
longline fisheries on shark populations. Most of the
research on Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries
has been conducted by the Oceanic Fisheries Program
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of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. It is likely
that some damage to the tuna species currently in
trouble (bigeye and yellowfin) is the result of high
levels of fishing going on around Philippines and
Indonesia, about which there is insufficient research
data. Around Pacific island countries, damage to
bigeye and yellowfin stocks seems to come from purse
seine operations accidentally catching large amounts
of juvenile fishes that congregate under industrial-
scale fish-aggregating devices, especially in the
equatorial zone (including the waters of Papua New
Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall
Islands and Kiribati). Since the 1990s, purse-seining
has seen the greatest increase in growth in Pacific tuna
fisheries: 2004 levels were the highest on record in
2005, and 2005 levels may exceed that. Therefore, the
most pressing fisheries management issue seems to
be the amount of purse-seine fishing, especially
around fish aggregating devices.
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(WCPFC) is the organisation responsible for
facilitating multilateral fisheries management in this
region. The WCPFC first met in December 2004, with
scientific and technical meetings scheduled
throughout 2005, and the second general meeting
taking place in December 2005. The Scientific
Committee of the WCPFC, hosted by the SPC,
concluded in 2005 that bigeye and yellowfin stocks
were in worse shape than previously suspected. The
Scientific Committee thus made a recommendation
to the WCPFC that fishing mortality levels be cut to
2001 levels. This signalled unprecedented levels of
alarm about the sustainability of Pacific tuna fisheries.
Nevertheless, the 2005 meeting of the WCPFC decided
only to limit purse-seining to 2004 levels (much higher
than that recommended) and failed to make a strong
commitment to limit the use of fish aggregating
devices. In addition, thus far the WCPFC has not
attempted to tackle the possible overfishing occurring
around Philippines (a full member of WCPFC) or
Indonesia (a ‘cooperating non-member’).
The reasons the WCPFC did not rise to the
challenge of protecting the economic and
environmental sustainability of Pacific tuna fisheries
in 2005 are complex. In some senses the lack of action
taken by the WCPFC could be seen as a victory for
short-term commercial interests over the long-term
interests of member countries. Another interpretation
is that the Pacific islands countries are acting counter
to their stated goal of capturing more wealth from
tuna industries in an environmentally sustainable and
socially equitable manner. Pacific islands countries
have the most to lose from failing to manage the
region’s tuna fisheries effectively, and since around
two-thirds of purse-seine fishing is conducted within
their collective maritime jurisdiction in their exclusive
economic zones, they also have the potential to exert
far greater control over regional tuna fisheries than
they have thus far.
Pacific island governments and tuna fisheries
Pacific island governments are the key to managing
the region’s tuna resources. Fishing companies and
their respective governments, and international
organisat-ions have important roles to play. But the
fact remains that only Pacific island governments can
legislate for and implement fisheries measures in their
exclusive economic zones. In addition, the WCPFC
was established with a chambered voting system,
wherein Pacific islands countries form one voting
chamber and other members the other chamber.
Structurally, the WCPFC recognises the primacy of
Pacific island governments in driving fisheries
management for the region. Apart from possibly
Papua New Guinea (which has by far the largest
fishery) no one Pacific island country exerts significant
influence. However, as a group, the Pacific island
countries, particularly the equatorial subgroup of
countries where most fishing occurs, have the power
to set the agenda in the WCPFC.
Unfortunately, many Pacific island governments
have a range of governance problems that make
managing fisheries difficult. A lack of government
resources through very small revenue bases is one of
the foundations of governance problems. Government
departments are small so there may not be enough
staff or staff with the relevant training. Creating an
effective and comprehensive legislative framework is
a large undertaking. It is expensive to run patrol boats
and other kinds of surveillance to monitor fisheries.
It takes resources to enforce fisheries regulations and
prosecute offenders. Other problems are related to
corruption. Unscrupulous fishing companies can
evade fisheries management regulations if officials are
willing to allow this in return for payment. Other kinds
of problems relate to dysfunctional electoral systems
and party politics, where governments and ministers
change so often politicians cannot develop enough
expertise in their portfolio to make coherent strategic
CRAWFORD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT12
Fishing Futures
policies. Donor organisations have attempted to
address governance problems in their development
programs in several Pacific island countries, but have
not yet made much headway in assisting Pacific island
governments to improve the situation.
Pacific island governments should take the lead
in ensuring that the region’s tuna fisheries are
sustainable, both because they are most at risk from
unsustainable fisheries, and because they have the
most power over regional tuna fisheries. In order to
be able to do this, however, Pacific island governments
need to improve governance such that they can
effectively exercise their sovereign powers. In
addition, they also need to cooperate more closely
with the other Pacific island governments to achieve
effective fisheries management, and avoid being
co-opted by wealthy fishing interests.
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